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Introduction 
 Core principles of the competition law, applicable globally, has been formed and 
been developed by the US antitrust law, the EU competition law, OECD and 
International Competition Network (ICN). This consensus view on the competition law 
first posits that the competition law is the law to protect competition process in which 
enterprises form spontaneous market order.  
This idea of the competition law is contrary to the idea of direct governmental 
commands on enterprises’ activities. Provisions in the competition law, therefore, firstly, 
need to take the form of negative rules limiting enterprises’ area of freedom. Such 
negative rules leave enterprises room to behave freely, excepting actions in breach of the 
negative rules, and thus spontaneous market order is constantly formed without direct 
governmental commands.  Second, the consensus view posits that sound competition 
process is such that tends to achieve maximization of consumer welfare or total welfare. 
Controversy remains on the choice between consumer welfare and total welfare, but the 
two are approximately the same. Third, global consensus has been formed on the 
necessity to prohibit naked price cartels and similar naked agreements among 
competitors—“hard-core cartels”. Fourth, on enterprises’ activities other than “hard-core 
cartels”, consensus has yet to be formed, although the idea to limit antitrust agencies’ 
intervention to conduct by dominant enterprises—those with market power—has been 
gaining force. 
 However, such consensus view has not yet become a universally accepted view: 
considerable number of countries maintains competition laws which contain provisions in 
variance with the consensus view. First, some countries exempt from their competition 
laws several industries or companies (nationalized companies in particular) considered 
strategically important for the government’s industrial policy.  Second, some countries 
have incorporated in the objective of competition law protection of small-and-medium 
enterprises, which takes the form of regulating unfair trade practices. 
 Asian countries need to review one’s own competition laws from the perspective 
of the existing consensus view. Nevertheless, such self-assessment cannot be conducted 
in a political and cultural vacuum. A country’s competition law is much affected by the 
country’s political environment and cultural tradition. This paper takes up, as a case study, 
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the competition law of Japan (the Antimonopoly Act: the AMA) in order to draw lessons 
for developing countries, particularly in Asia.  
I. Common Understanding on the Competition Law 
A. Common Understanding on the Competition Law as the Basis of 
the Rule of Law 
The wider becomes the common understanding on the competition law, the more 
incentive and pressure the legislature in a country have to follow the consensus view in 
setting up its country’s competition law and rules. Common understanding on the 
competition law, then, functions as a kind of the rule of law, namely natural law which 
embodies “general rules that apply equally to everybody.”1   
Considerable degree of common understanding has already been formed regarding 
the objectives and contents of the competition law.  Competition laws have as their origin 
in the US antitrust law. The concept and contents of the US antitrust law has spread to 
Europe, Japan and other countries. Because of their common origin and subsequent 
global development, competition laws of major countries share common core concepts: 
i.e. prohibition of hard-core cartels; prohibition of mergers that create market power. 
More fundamentally, competition laws are predominantly agreed to be laws to 
protect competition process, in which enterprises are prohibited to engage in certain areas 
of conduct regarded as harmful to competition; but enterprises are not ordered to perform 
concrete actions: i.e. price their products at certain concrete levels. The competition law, 
therefore, has been prescribed as negative rules; outside the prohibited domains, 
enterprises are free to act as they like, leading to spontaneous market order.  In other 
words, in order to generate spontaneous order, the rule of law needs to “determine 
boundaries of freedom by laying down rules that enable each to ascertain where he is free 
to act.”2 
However, degree of convergence on competition laws in the world is not uniform. In 
spite of their common origin and harmonization efforts by OECD and International 
                                                 
1
 Hayek (1960), p.153. 
2
 Hayek (1973), Vol.1, p.107. 
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Competition Network (ICN), considerable differences still remain among competition 
laws of countries.  
 
B. Converged Area of Competition laws as the basis of the Common 
understanding on the Competition Law 
Convergence of competition laws are most advanced with regard to the US and EU 
competition laws. “Best practices” of competition law developed by ICN and OECD are 
based on the converged area of the US and EU competition laws. The US and EU 
competition laws, from the perspective of the rule of law, has the merit in that both 
jurisdictions grasp the competition law as negative rules, leaving enterprises freedom, 
leading to spontaneous market order. 
As to the objectives of the competition law, the US and EU laws have been 
converged in setting the objective of the competition law as maximization of consumer 
welfare. Consumer welfare is virtually identical with the total welfare of a country. 
Setting the objective as consumer welfare (or total welfare) is contrasted with setting the 
objective as benefitting certain stratum of the population, i.e. small-and-medium 
enterprises or national champions. 
Convergence has also been achieved between the US and EU regarding the 
classification of competitive activities regulated by the competition law: (1) Horizontal 
restraints, (2) Vertical restraints, (3) Mergers and acquisitions, (4) Unilateral conduct. 
Many other countries also followed this classification: China, among other countries, 
emulated this classification in setting up its own competition law. 
Between the US and EU, substantial convergence has also been achieved regarding 
substance of regulatory principles, which has been publicized to other countries through 
ICN and OECD. First, hard-core cartels are condemned with penalties in both 
jurisdictions. This principle has led to the OECD Council Recommendation.3 Naked price 
cartels, therefore, are condemned as per se illegal. Second, merger regulation has also 
                                                 
3
   See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 
C(98)35/FINAL (25 March 1998) at §1 (“Member countries should ensure that their 
competition laws effectively halt and deter hard core cartels”), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf (visited 30 November 2008). 
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largely been converged with the adoption of the market power principle: regulators need 
to intervene when mergers bring about market power, although the degree in 
consideration of efficiency effects varies among jurisdictions.  
On the other hand, regulation of vertical restraints remains largely not converged, 
although the market power principle--the idea that regulators may intervene only when 
market power exists -- has gained much influence in both jurisdictions. Regulation of 
unitary conduct also remains largely not converged, although the market power principle 
is commonly adopted in both jurisdictions. 
Such globally common understanding on the objective and substance of competition 
laws may constitute the natural law to be impartially applied to everybody. In summary, 
the common understanding consists of the following ideas and concepts: (1) the 
competition law rules need to consist of negative commands bounding freedom of 
corporate activities, rather than positive commands to order specific actions; (2) 
Objective of the competition law is to raise consumer welfare through preservation of 
competitive process; (3) enterprises’ activities are classified into horizontal restraints, 
vertical restraints, mergers and acquisitions, and unilateral conduct;(4) Naked price 
cartels need to be prohibited. 
Last but not the least, the rule of law intrinsically requires that the competition law 
be applied impartially to all the players in the competitive process. This consideration 
precludes exemptions from the competition law which aim to benefit certain strata of the 
economy: nationalized enterprises, small and medium enterprises etc. 
 
C. Consumer welfare versus fairness as the objectives of competition 
law: Case of Japan 
For the competition law of Japan, as well as those of other East Asian countries4, 
major concern arises regarding incorporation in the objectives of the competition law 
attainment of fairness. 
For the competition law of Japan-- the Antimonopoly Act (the AMA)--, this issue 
concerns the “unfair trade” regulation in the AMA. The AMA was inaugurated in 1947 
                                                 
4
 Beside Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam have unfair trade practices 
clause in their competition laws. 
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after Japan’s defeat in World War II, under the strong leadership of the US Occupation 
Forces. The AMA, therefore, was modeled largely along the lines of US antitrust laws. 
However, the provision for regulation of unfair trade practices was added to the AMA, 
making the AMA clauses more complicated than those of the US Sherman Act.  
Unfair trade practices (UTPs) are regarded by the JFTC and Japanese scholars as 
consisting of three different categories: (1) competition restrictions which is harmful to 
competition without amounting to market power; (2) inherently unfair methods of 
competition which are prohibited without requirement of showing competition restrictive 
effects; (3) “abuse of a superior bargaining position” (also called “disruption of 
fundamentals in free market order”). 
All of the three categories of UTPs pose problems regarding observance of the rule 
of law. First, unitary (exclusionary) conduct, as well as vertical restraints, has been 
regulated as belonging to the first category of UTPs. This regulation allows JFTC much 
latitude in condemning restrictive conduct because UTPs may be found illegal when 
exclusionary or vertical conduct merely risk harming fair competition. In contrast, the 
anti-monopolization clause (the AMA article 2 (5) requires JFTC to identify market 
power for condemning unitary conduct. Consequently, the first category of UTPs 
regulation is at odds with the idea of the rule of law because the regulation is not able to 
demarcate areas of illegal conduct.  
Second, certain types of business activities have been considered inherently unfair, 
so that those activities are prohibited, as belonging to the second type of UTPs, without 
the need for JFTC to show their anti-competitiveness. JFTC has mostly used the 
inherently unfair regulation for direct consumer protection—regulation of misleading 
advertisements and representations. Nevertheless, JFTC has extended the inherently 
unfair regulation to tying and other restrictive activities: i.e. obstruction of parallel 
imports. 
Regulation of misleading representations is required for protection of consumers. 
However, such regulation needs to be conducted within the context of governmental 
policy for consumer protection.  Mixing direct consumer protection with competition law 
enforcement blurs the boundary of illegal anticompetitive practices, thus undermining the 
rule of law.  
 7 / 17 
 
Moreover, JFTC’s condemnation of tying as inherently unfair has led to 
overregulation of tying. Contrary to the JFTC view, tying, as a practice similar to 
exclusive dealing, needs to be evaluated for both its competition restraining effects and 
its efficiency effects. 
In summary, fairness oriented competition law enforcement makes it impossible to 
demarcate area of illegal conduct, thus undermining the rule of law. 
 
D.  Protection of SMEs and Competition Law 
The third category of UTPs--“abuse of a superior bargaining position”—also 
undermines the rule of law. First, “a superior bargaining position” is identified without 
showing market power, requiring evidence of only relative bargaining power between the 
buyer and the supplier, identification of which is inherently subjective due to lack of  link 
to competition restraining effects.  
Second, determination of “abuse” is also inherently discretionary, allowing 
subjective judgment by the authority. In order to alleviate these concerns, JFTC set up, in 
2011, “Guidelines on Abuse of a Superior Bargaining Position”5, but “abuse” and “a 
superior bargaining position” still remain ambiguous, . Abuse regulation, without need 
for identification of market power, cannot escape from its inherent ambiguity, thus 
undermining the rule of law. 
 JFTC has utilized the regulation of superior bargaining position mostly for 
intervening into contracts between large-scale retailers and small-and-medium suppliers. 
This is basically the policy for protecting SMEs, without link to the consensus view of 
the competition law—consumer welfare. Protection of SMEs may have some public 
demands, but such protection needs to be implemented outside competition law, within 
the narrowly defined area. Conducting SMEs’ protection policy within the competition 
law undermines logical application of competition law through blurring the boundary of 
illegal conduct. 
 
                                                 
5
 JFTC…………. 
 8 / 17 
 
E. Implication for Developing Countries 
Developing countries are advised to take as a model in setting up their competition 
laws the emerging consensus on the objective and contents of the competition law. For 
this objective, developing countries need to learn from the globally accumulated wisdom 
regarding competition rules. For this objective, it would be helpful for developing 
countries to participate in ICN as well as to learn from the OECD works on competition 
law. 
Developing countries are advised to set the objective of its competition law as the 
maximization of consumer welfare, and consequently not to include fairness oriented 
regulation in its competition law. Direct protection of consumers need to be pursued 
separately from competition law and policy. Protection or promotion of SMEs, if 
considered necessary to implement, also needs to be pursued separately from competition 
law.   
II. Political Environment and development of the Competition law and Policy: 
Case of Japan 
 
Markets are economic institutions, and thus are dependent on political and social 
acceptance of competition.6 Improvement in competition law enforcement, therefore, 
needs to be exercised in the context of the political environment of the country. The rule 
of law loses much of its effectiveness if governments or legislators feel not constrained 
by the consensus view of the competition law, because politicians as legislators are 
authorized to change the contents of the competition law. Politicians, moreover, as 
members of the executive branch are authorized to appoint the head administrator (i.e. 
Chairman) of the competition agency, as well as allocating budgets to the competition 
agency.  
                                                 
6
 Gerber (2010), p.7. 
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A. Historical shifts in the political perception of competition law in 
Japan 
How the Competition law is formulated and enforced is much affected by the 
country’s stage of economic development. In case of Japanese competition law--the 
AMA--, although price cartels have been consistently tackled with, its enforcement had 
not been active during the rapid growth period of Japanese economy until the beginning 
of the 1990s.  
A major reason for the inactivity was lack of political support for the AMA and 
JFTC. Without support from the executive branch and the legislature, JFTC could not 
engage in aggressive enforcement of the AMA, fearing backlash from politicians and 
bureaucrats.  
Lack of active enforcement of the AMA did not hinder the rapid economic growth of 
Japanese economy because the Japanese economy had enjoyed the virtuous cycle of high 
saving ratio, high investment ratio and movement of labor from a low productivity sector 
(agriculture) to a high productivity sector (manufacturing). This fact, however, should not 
be interpreted as evidence that competition law is not necessary in the development stage 
of a country’s economic history. During the rapid growth period, the Japanese 
government maintained competitive market system, and the JFTC had continued to crack 
down on cartels. The rapid growth of Japanese economy was attained through sound 
market competition, in spite of the interventionist industrial policies.  
The economic stagnation in the 1990s induced changes in the political perception of 
the competition law. In face of unfavorable macro-economic conditions, Japanese 
government was newly pressured to raise economic efficiency in order to raise citizens’ 
standard of living through augmenting international competitiveness of the export 
industries. This caused strengthening of competition law and its enforcement by JFTC in 
the 1990s, typified by marked reductions in exemptions from the AMA  
After entering the 21st century, Japan has been experiencing significant population 
decline as well as aging of population, which is expected to deteriorate economic 
conditions. In order to overcome the unfavorable economic conditions, Japan is in need 
of increasing productivity in agriculture and service sectors, as well as raising innovation 
in the manufacturing sector through regulatory reforms and increased competition. 
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B.  Industrial Policy and the Competition law 
The rule of law requires impartial enforcement of competition law, and therefore is 
at odds with interventionist industrial policies. This is because, first, industrial policy as 
the picking up winner policy is contrary to the market principle in that government is 
inferior to market in picking up winning industries. Second, when industrial policies 
exempt certain industries (or enterprises) from enforcement of the competition law, it 
contradicts impartial application of the competition law, undermining the rule of law. 
Prevalent perception of Japan for the period until the end of the 1980s is that 
industrial policies overrode competition law and policy. If this perception reflected 
reality, usefulness of the rule of law in competition law would be denied since Japanese 
economy had achieved splendid economic growth until the end of the 1980s.  However, 
contrary to the widespread perception, Japan achieved the rapid economic growth 
through sound market competition, not by industrial policies. Recent economics studies 
mostly support this view.7 After the Occupation force dissolved Zaibatsu’s—large-scale 
financial and industrial conglomerates prevalent during and pre-Second World War era--, 
Japanese economy has sustained basically competitive structure.  
Moreover, Japan’s entry into GATT and OECD prevented the government from 
engaging in protectionist policies, guaranteeing that Japanese manufacturing industries 
face global competition.  Japanese government implemented Industrial policies, but most 
of them have been back-ward oriented: policies to protect mature or declining industries. 
Moreover, noteworthy policies of picking the winner —i.e. subsidies to promote main 
frame computer industry in the 1980s—turned out failures. Most Importantly for the 
competition law, industrial policies in Japan, since the 1990s, seldom exempted 
manufacturing sectors from the enforcement of the AMA.  
Superiority of competition policy and law over industrial policies have become 
clearer since the 1990s; Inferiority of government and bureaucracy to market system in 
picking up winners have become more apparent after Japan caught up with the advanced 
economies, losing a model for choosing successful industries. Thus, in recent years, the 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Ohkita…………….. 
 11 / 17 
 
role of METI—the bastion of industrial policy in Japan-- has continuously been reduced 
in Japanese government, resulting in considerable loss of clout for METI bureaucrats. 
C. Exemptions from Competition law 
Exempting certain industries or enterprises from enforcement of the competition law 
is contrary to the rule of law because it contradicts impartial application of the law. 
Exemptions from competition law are rarely, if ever, rationalized from the viewpoint of 
the objective of competition law because competition law is flexible enough to allow 
competition restraints when such restraints are beneficial to the consumer welfare. 
In case of Japan, exemptions from the AMA had been prevalent until the beginning 
of the 1990s, depriving much of the effectiveness of the competition law enforcement. 
The exemptions have been partly implemented for industrial policy purposes, and partly 
for simple protection of special interests. These exemptions have exerted harmful effects.  
Several exemptions had been set up due to lack of understanding on competition law: 
i.e. exemption for rationalization cartels. Beneficial cooperation for rationalization may 
be legally conducted without exemption from competition law, because the competition 
law is able to be flexibly applied to accommodate cooperation among competing firms 
when cooperation raises consumer welfare.  
Japanese government, in the 1990s, drastically curtailed the AMA exemptions. 
Repealed exemptions include those related to natural monopolies (rail, electricity etc.), as 
well as an exemption for depression cartels (cartels to reduce production quantities or 
production facilities in depressed industries where prices do not cover costs).  
Nevertheless, existing exemptions have been obstructing market force in the 
exempted area, hindering efficiency of Japanese industries. Current exemptions from the 
AMA concern 21 activities authorized by 15 laws (Sea Transport Act, Air Transport Act, 
etc.). This is a marked decline from 89 activities authorized by 30 laws in 1995.   Most 
exemptions are on price (or rate) cartels in such industries as insurance, sea transport and 
airlines. These exempted cartels have shielded their industries from competition, and thus 
retarded efficiency. 
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D. Implication for Developing Countries 
At a developmental stage of economy, it is most important that the government 
harness virtuous cycle of economic growth through maintaining sound market 
competition. Competition law enforcement needs to be placed as one of elements in 
economy-wide competition policy. Interventionist industrial policy needs to be eschewed 
in favor of policies to harness market economy. As a country’s economy matures, 
competition law needs to be enforced more aggressively in order to maintain market 
competition. 
Developing countries need to avoid setting up exemptions from competition law. 
Exemptions are set up for either interventionist industrial policies or protection of special 
interests, thus leading to inefficiency in the economy. Beneficial cooperation among 
companies—i.e. rationalization cartels—may be allowed, without setting up exemptions, 
through flexible application of the competition law.  
III. Constraints to the Competition Law from International Relations 
Globalization of economy affects the rule of law for competition law: it exerts 
pressure on countries to conform to the consensus view of the competition law.  
A. “Market access” issue and pressure to conform to the consensus 
view of the competition law 
In large majority of countries, exports rather than imports are promoted in order to 
build up export industries and raise employment. In this mercantilist environment, those 
countries perceived to be protecting one’s market from imports are condemned as 
engaging in “beggar thy neighbor” policy.  
Weak content and enforcement of competition law tends to be perceived as a kind of 
“beggar thy neighbor” policy because weak competition law allows domestic countries to 
engage in exclusionary conduct hindering market access from foreign countries. Japan 
experienced such accusation at the end of the 1980s, resulting in moving the AMA closer 
to the consensus view of the competition law. This was brought by the “Structural 
Impediments Initiative (SII)” engaged between the US and Japan from 1989 to 1990, in 
which US officials pressured the Japanese government to strengthen the AMA, resulting 
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in more active enforcement by JFTC against bid riggings, setting up the AMA guidelines 
against vertical restraints, as well as strengthening sanctions against cartels.   
B. Globalization of markets and competition laws 
The market-access oriented discussion on competition tends to be dominated by 
mercantilist consideration. In today’s globalized world, however, competition laws need 
to be converged, not for mercantilist objective but for realizing harmonized approach 
against competition restraining conduct by globalized enterprises. Nevertheless, such 
harmonization has not been realized: major countries’ competition laws—particularly 
those of the US and EU—currently govern global markets through the extra-territorial 
application of competition laws.8  
1.  Global competition rule at WTO 
WTO, with its almost universal membership and with its effective dispute resolution 
mechanism, is the most appropriate international institution to achieve global 
harmonization of competition laws.  The competition rule at WTO may take as the model 
the WTO treaty on intellectual properties--TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights), under which member countries are obligated to fulfill the minimum 
rules established by the TRIPS. However, this is a long-term endeavor; developing 
countries have opposed to such idea, thus the Doha round failed to include in its agenda 
the promulgation of the world competition rule. 
2. Role of FTAs 
Currently, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), rather than WTO, has more potential to 
move countries’ competition laws toward the consensus view.  FTAs, although they 
violate the non-discrimination principle of WTO, are allowed to exist under the WTO 
Treaty on the condition that the FTAs achieve nearly complete integration of markets 
among member countries. For such integration, convergence of member countries’ 
competition laws logically needs to be accomplished because they govern rules on market 
competition. However, in actual FTAs, harmonization of competition law has stopped 
                                                 
8
 Gerber (2010), p.3 (“The laws of individual states govern global markets.”) 
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short of convergence of competition law, achieving merely coordination in member 
countries’ law enforcements.  
 Since the competition laws of the US and EU has largely been converged and most 
well represent the consensus view of the competition law, the FTAs whose members 
include the US or EU are expected to exert the strongest pressure on other member 
countries to change their competition laws (and their enforcements), moving them closer 
to the consensus view of the competition law.  
Nevertheless, in the existing FTAs, harmonization of competition laws has not been 
pursued, excepting the Australia/New Zealand FTA (The ANZCERTA).  This shows that 
most of the existing FTAs do not aim to achieve deep integration of economies. 
Moreover, compared to the WTO competition rule, competition rules established under 
the FTAs exert less pressure on member countries because FTAs have lacked effective 
dispute resolution mechanism, with which WTO is equipped.  
 
3. ICN, OECD and UNCTAD 
International Competition Network (ICN) and OECD have been engaged in 
establishing consensus view of the competition law largely influenced by the converged 
US and EU competition law models. UNCTAD also has been engaged in establishing 
competition law models, but the model espoused by UNCTAD is more interventionist 
and more focused on development policy, resulting in short of the rule of law model of 
the competition law.  
C. Implication for Developing Countries 
Developing countries, in order to develop its economic potential, need to engage 
themselves in global economy. Global economy, through its international institutions and 
trade relations, exerts pressure on developing countries to conform to the consensus view 
of the competition law. Governments and competition agencies of developing countries 
are encouraged to make use of the international pressure in order to rationalize their 
competition laws in opposition to protectionist endeavors by the vested interests. 
Membership of developing countries in ICN would prove effective for them to get to 
grips with the intricacies of the consensus model of the competition law. Nevertheless, 
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ICN is a voluntary organization, and thus its competition law models and guidance are of 
voluntary nature. It depends on the willingness of developing countries whether 
membership in ICN will work to move them to adopt the consensus view of the 
competition law.  
IV.   Competition Agency: Role of Chairman or Head Administrators 
Competition laws legislated by the legislature are often ambiguous in contents; this 
provides opportunities for the competition agency to set up its own agenda. Nevertheless, 
the competition agency, although generally granted considerable independence, is subject 
to control or surveillance from both the legislature and the executive branch of the 
government. 
A. Case of Japan 
The competition agency of Japan—JFTC-- is composed of Commissioners and the 
Secretariat. Five Commissioners (Chairman and four Commissioners) are authorized to 
act independently from the government (the AMA art. 28).9 Nevertheless, Independence 
of JFTC is limited in practice. First, the legislature is authorized to amend the content of 
the AMA. Second, the executive branch (Prime Minister) appoints Commissioners (most 
importantly the Chairman). The executive branch has usually chosen JFTC Chairmen 
from former top directors of influential government ministries, predominantly the 
Ministry of Finance. This choice reflects the executive branch’s preference for a 
Chairman who is well connected to political circle, with little possibility to act 
disruptively to the status quo. Indeed, some of former Chairmen had acted like 
weathercocks, forming polices to suit contemporaneous political situations. 
Such emphasis on political connection weakens intellectual straightforwardness of 
the competition law enforcement. It is true that the current JFTC regime has implemented 
several commendable policies: active enforcements against bid riggings, and raise in the 
amount of fines, as well as introduction of leniency system. Such policies were in line 
with the reformist movement in the executive branch under the leadership of the former 
                                                 
9
 the JFTC, as a governmental organization, comes under the Cabinet Office (AMA arts. 
27, 28) 
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Prime Minister Koizumi. On the other hand, JFTC has neglected renewal of its outmoded 
Guidelines on Distribution Practices, thus ambiguous standard on unfair trade practices 
has been left intact. 
 Moreover, JFTC did not oppose the 2011 AMA amendment initiated by the 
legislature, whereby certain violations on unfair trade practices were selectively chosen to 
become targets of fines. The amendment was conducted by legislators who got 
influenced by bureaucrats at METI, who consider the AMA mainly as a vehicle for 
policies to protect SMEs. This enlargement of fines to selected unfair trade practices 
undermines impartial application of the competition law, since SMEs are 
disproportionately protected under the current fine system. JFTC could not antagonize the 
political establishment which emphasizes protection of SMEs at the sacrifice of 
consumers. 
 
B. Implication for Developing Countries 
It is inescapable that the top executives of the competition agency are picked by the 
executive branch. The executive branch is hoped to choose competent personnel for the 
top posts at the competition agency, not putting too much emphasis on political 
connectivity of the personnel. 
The Secretariat in charge of the competition law enforcement needs to be composed 
of professionals competent in the competition law and economics, in order to harness 
within the secretariat aggregate competency in the competition law. In order to 
accomplish this result, the competition agency needs to be a unified single organization, 
composed of staff who maintain long-term career within the competition agency, without 
short-term staff rotation among governmental agencies. 
 
Conclusions 
Competition laws in the world have achieved considerable convergence, to which the US 
and EU competition laws have made the most notable contributions. The converged area 
of competition laws forms the consensus view of the competition law in its contents and 
ideas, which conforms to the rule of law, in the sense of the natural law impartially 
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applied to everybody.  Developing countries are encouraged to follow the consensus view 
of the competition law in establishing and developing their competition laws.   
Political environment of a country affects how competition law and policy is 
developed. Japanese experience teaches us that the government needs to consistently 
nourish competitive market conditions, eschewing both industrial policies and 
exemptions from the competition law. Governments are also encouraged to make good 
use of the international pressure in order to improve its competition law in opposition to 
the vested interests. 
 Competition agencies, under the constraint of control by the legislature and the 
executive branch, need to preserve its independence in its law enforcement. The 
competition agency needs to be unified, and its secretariat needs to avoid short-term 
rotation of its staff among governmental agencies.  
 
